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First Bank of Lincoln ("First Bank") submits this brief in replyl to Land Title of Nez
Perce County's ("Land Title") Respondent's Brief. For reference convenience, as much as
possible, First Bank's Reply Brief utilizes the same outline as the Respondent Land Title's
Brief.

I. CASE STATEMENT
A.

Nature Of The Case And Argument Summary.
Land Title frames this matter as whether a secured creditor should recover twice for

the same debt and recover an unjustified windfall. Land Title's "double recovery/windfall"
claim is a false premise that ignores the uncontested facts and pleadings of this matter, all of
which establish that First Bank does not seek double recovery. Instead, First Bank seeks to
be made whole by recovering the amount of its original loan ($440,000.00), less what it
received when it resold the Hotel Lincoln to a good faith purchaser ($190,000.00). 2
There is little doubt that First Bank incurred damages in this matter as it was never
repaid the full amount of the Hotel loan. The primary issues before this Court are: (1) did the
District Court err as to Montana deficiency law and the full credit bid rule; and (2) who
proximately caused the First Bank's loan shortfall and therefore should be held liable for it?
It is uncontested that Tuschoff s Hotel loan could not take place without sufficient
collateral. This collateral was comprised of the Hotel and Tuschoffs interest in the Bowling

1

Errata: First Bank's initial brief at pg. 32, line three contains a "typo:" The phrase "not untenable"
is incorrect; the word "not" should be deleted.

1

Alley. When Tuschoff's rights in the Bowling Alley were assigned to

Bank, it stood in

Tuschoff' s shoes and whatever rights Tuschoff had, and whatever duties Land Title owed
Tuschoff, were transferred to First Bank.
Further, when the Bowling Alley was to be sold, Land Title had notice of First
Bank's interest. Land Title was directed to pay off First Bank's interest and Land Title
represented that it would do so. At the time of closing, despite the assignment and in breach
of its fiduciary duty and contractual obligations, Land Title negligently distributed the
Bowling Alley sale funds to Tuschoff and paid nothing to First Bank. First Bank submits
that under commonly accepted majority law, Land Title is responsible for these breaches, its
negligence, and the damages that stem from its nonfeasance.
In response, Land Title argues that under Montana deficiency law and the full credit
bid rule,

nonfeasance is excused, because under the plain terms of Montana's anti-

deficiency statute there can be no loan deficiency and at the Hotel foreclosure sale, First
Bank made a full credit bid which extinguished the loan debt.
First Bank replies that Montana's anti-deficiency law does not apply to commercial
transactions such as the one at bar. The parties agree that the full credit bid mle was meant
to protect borrowers, not third-parties. Land Title concedes an exception to the full credit bid
rule, but claims the exception is limited to instances of fraud or misconduct. First Bank
responds that the failure of an escrow agent to properly pay out funds held in trust

2

The amounts used are a close example, but do not include contractually required interest,
payments, fees, costs, etc.

2

constitutes misconduct

cites case law which

that matters involving breach of

contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation are also
excepted from the full credit bid rule. Hence, as a matter of law, neither the Montana antideficiency statute nor the full credit bid rule apply to this matter and the District Court erred
when it ruled otherwise.
In short, the instant case is one where Land Title blames First Bank

Land Title's

nonfeasance. Timing and sequencing are important and show that Land Title, while acting as
an escrow, held funds in trust, that, via assignment, belonged to First Bank. There is little
doubt Land Title was acting in a fiduciary capacity. Given Land Title's fiduciary duties and
contractual obligations, it should have paid First Bank when the Bowling Alley sale closed.
Had Land Title done so, the sale funds would have been applied to Tuschoffs Hotel loan
and Land Title's failure would not have opened the door to default and foreclosure. But for
Land Title's nonfeasance, none ofus would be before the Court.
The uncontested facts and concomitant law establish that Land Title was the direct
and proximate cause3 of the damages sustained by First Bank. Land Title should be held
liable as a matter of law and the District Court's failure to do so constitutes an error of law.
In the alternative, there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

3

IDJI 2.30. l sets forth the jury instruction for the proximate cause, "but for" test, and provides, in
part: "proximate cause" means "a cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the
complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the damage would not have occurred . .ti
need not be the onlv cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
loss or damage." (emphasis added)

3

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

In its motion for summary judgment, Land Title asserted that there were no issues of
material fact and it sought dismissal of all of the causes of action of First Bank's complaint.
In its cross-motion for summary judgment, First Bank averred that there were no issues of
material fact and it pursued judgment on the causes of action of its complaint.
In the lower court's Opinion and Order on Summary Judgment (CR pgs. 723 - 730),
the Honorable Judge Jeff Brudie addressed Montana deficiency law and the full credit bid
rule. Notably, he stated: "[h]aving granted Land Title's motion for summary judgment [on
the basis of Montana deficiency law and the full credit bid rule] the Court need not decide
the other issues raised on summary judgment by either party." Id., at pg. 6, Ftn 8.
Land Title's Response brief at § II (B), pg. 11, raises issues as "alternative grounds"
which "provide an independent basis to uphold the District Court's decision." Because the
District Court did not address the alternative grounds, First Bank did not address these
alternative grounds in its original brief. Via Land Title's alternative grounds argument, it has
opened the door to these additional appeal issues:
Whether the District Court erred when it did not hold that Land Title was negligent
as a matter of law;
Whether the District Court erred when it failed to hold that Land Title breached its
contract and harmed First Bank;
Whether the District Court erred when it did not order Land Title to specifically
perform the contract and pay First Bank in accordance with the escrow instructions;
and

4

Whether the District Court erred when it did not hold that Land Title should be
estopped from not doing what it was supposed to do and represented, in writing, that
it would do.
In its Response In Opposition to Summary Judgment CR 468 - 507, as to summary
judgement and issues of fact Land Title argued:
First Bank is in error in so indicating or implying that Land Title does not
take issue with the underlying facts in this regard. In the event that the Court
finds the grounds raised in Land Title's motion for summary judgment are
not appropriate to grant Land Title summary judgment in its favor, evaluation
of the remaining arguments in Plaintiffs Memo. will show that those
arguments fall short of demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact
such as to justify granting summary judgment in First Bank's favor.
CR 471. Land Title next argued that even if the full credit bid rule was not applied a material
issue of fact as to the fair market value of the property exists, precluding summary
judgment. CR 481 and 482. Land Title went on to argue that there is an issue of fact as to
negligence in the form of a deviation from applicable duty. CR 488 and 489. With regard to
First Bank's estoppel action Land Title argued that: "[a]t the very least, there is a triable
issue of fact as to whether there is an enforceable contract between Land Title and First
American upon which Plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim may be based. Either way,
summary judgment on this claim in favor of First Bank is inappropriate." CR 496 - 497.
Land Title further argued that issues of comparative fault vis-a-vis First American Title and
Land Title preclude summary judgment, citing its affirmative defenses. CR 497. In
conclusion, Land Title stated:
For the reasons set forth above, there are a number of legal defenses
raised in Land Title's Motion for Summary Judgment that provide
independent grounds for dismissing some or all of First Bank's Complaint,

5

including the Montana Anti Deficiency Statute, the Full Credit Bid Rule, the
Economic Loss Rule and others. However, if the Court finds that those do not
apply to dismiss the case, then genuine material issues of fact stand in the
way of summary judgment in favor of First Bank, including the failure to
identify a duty owed, issues of comparative fault, contributory negligence
and failure to make out a prima facie case on damages/mitigation of damages
and election of remedies.
CR 505 - 506. Hence, as to issues that are before the Court, Land Title has argued that there
are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
No reply is necessary to this section, but see, infra, at § IV D.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

Standard Of Review.
No reply is necessary.

B.

Montana Deficiency Law And Modern Full Credit Bid Rule Law Establish That
The District Court Erred.
Montana law's anti-deficiency statute does not apply to commercial property.

Montana law also requires that its courts consider the intrinsic value of the property sold.
The District Court erred when it did not hold that there was a deficiency in the matter at bar.
The District Court further erred when it held that the full credit bid rule bars First Bank's
claims.
1.

Montana's Anti-Deficiency Statute Does Not Apply To Commercial
Property.

Land Title argues that the plain language of Montana's anti-deficiency statute
justifies the District Court's decision. Land Title's claim ignores the Montana Supreme

6

Court's interpretation of

anti-deficiency statute, ignores the clear language of First State

Bank v. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 66-67, 734 P.2d 1203, 1210 (1987), and disregards the
Honorable James P. Reynolds' Opinion (See, Appendix 8 - 19) that construes Montana law
as it applies to the facts of this case.
When construing § 71-1-317, the Montana Supreme Court has unfailingly limited
this statutory prohibition to deeds of trust used as security for the financing of occupied,
single-family, residential property. Chunkapura, supra, ("Our opinion in this cause is ... to
be considered as precedent only for trust deeds related to occupied, single family residential
property." Order on Rehearing, 734 P.2d at 1211). See also, First Federal Savings and Loan

Association of ,Missoula v. Anderson, 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d 1281 (1989), where the
Montana Court upheld Chunkapura, so far as it relates to single family, occupied residential
property. Trs. of Wash-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp 'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P 'ship,
239 Mont. 250, 780 P.2d 608 (1989) ("Galleria I") where the Court determined "[wJhen a
lender holding a trust indenture as security chooses to foreclose under the mortgage laws,

Chunkapura as modified holds that except for occupied single family residential property,
lenders can obtain a deficiency judgment even on trust indentures." 239 Mont. at 258, 780
P.2d at 613. These three cases establish that the Montana Supreme Court protects consumers
of occupied, single family residences from deficiency judgments, however the Montana
Court has not expressed an intent to protect commercial loans such as the one at bar.
Land Title casts Chunkapura as an ambiguous case that may or may not apply to
trustees'

of commercial property. In fact, the rehearing opinion

7

Chunkapura is clear

that the anti-deficiency statute does not apply to commercial property, regardless of the type
of foreclosure sale. The Chunkapura rehearing opinion states:
The rationale of our decision in Chunkapura is based upon the "quid pro
quo" suggested to the legislature to secure passage of the Small Tract
Financing Act, that is the giving up of a deficiency judgment on the one hand
by the lenders in exchange for the giving up by the borrowers of the right of
possession to the property for one year and the right of redemption after
foreclosure sale. Such quid pro quo does not apply to loans made in
commercial settings, nor to trust deeds secured by residential or other
property which are only part of larger, more complex loans for commercial or
agricultural purposes.
Chunkapura, supra., 226 Mont. 54, 66-67, 734 P.2d 1203, 1210 (1987) (emphasis added).

Montana's anti-deficiency statute was adopted to exchange a borrower's right of
redemption for the lender's right to pursue a deficiency. Id. Because there is no right of
redemption for commercial property in Montana, the Montana Supreme Court recognized
that lenders must retain the right to pursue a deficiency for commercial property. Id. The
reasoning and ruling of Chunkapura does not distinguish between judicial sales and trustee's
sales. The District Court therefore correctly declined to apply the anti-deficiency statute to
the commercial property at issue here.
Land Title's deficiency judgment analysis also avoids the Order on Motion for
Summary Judgment (Appendix 8 - 19) issued by Judge Reynolds in the Montana District
Court of the First Judicial District (See, Appendix 8 - 19). Judge Reynolds is, to date, the
only Montana Judge who has construed Montana law as it applies to the facts of this case.
Pointedly, in accordance with Montana law, Judge Reynolds held that because the trust
indenture was not for a single family residence, but for a commercial transaction, a

8

deficiency amount owmg could be calculated. Appendix 16. Likewise, he noted that
foreclosing on a trust indenture for a commercial transaction can result in a deficiency
amount being owed to the lender, concluding: "in this case, the Bank could claim a
deficiency amount owing if the amount bid was insufficient to satisfy the Bank's loan."
Appendix 17.
In accordance with three cited holdings of the Montana Supreme Court, and Judge
Reynold's opinion, which cites and applies Galleria I, supra, First Bank can claim a
deficiency amount O\ving.
2.

Montana Law Requires Courts To Consider The Intrinsic Value Of Property
Sold To Determine A Deficiency.
a.

Stuart does not control deficiencies following the foreclosure
commercial property.

Appellee cites numerous authorities from jurisdictions other than Montana in support
of its argument for application of the full credit bid rule. Deficiency law and the full credit
bid rule are inexorably intertwined and Montana case law is controlling on the question of
how a trustee's sale bid should be applied to a deficiency amount on Montana commercial
property. Thus, this Court need not look to other jurisdictions. As to Montana law, Land
Title cites two cases: Rocky Mt. Bank

v.

Stuart, 280 Mont. 74, 928 P.2d 243 (1996); and

Jurgens v. Hauser, 19 Mont. 184, 47 P. 809 (1897).
Stuart concerned a credit bid at a trustee's sale of residential property under the
Small Tract Financing Act. Stuart, 280 Mont. at 77, 928 P.2d at 245. Stuart did not, and due
to its factual background could not, decide the question of how deficiencies are calculated in

9

a foreclosure of commercial property. Instead, Stuart simply acknowledged that a credit bid
was a proper means of bidding at a foreclosure sale. Id., 280 Mont. at 81, 928 P .2d at 24 7.
Moreover, the general proposition for which Appellee cites Stuart-that a credit bid is
equivalent to a cash bid-was qualified by the Galleria line of cases, which hold that the
"intrinsic value" of the real property is the only measure of the deficiency, rather than the
amount bid at the sale. Galleria I, supra. See also Trs. of Wash-Idaho-Montana CarpentersEmployers Ret. Tr. Fund v. Galleria P'ship, 250 Mont. 175, 819 P.2d 158 (1991) ("Galleria
II"). The Stuart Court did not address the deficiency question, and if it had, the residential
property at issue in that case would have been squarely controlled by the Montana antideficiency statute, as provided in Chunkapura, supra. Stuart is, therefore, immaterial to the
question of how Montana law determines a deficiency following foreclosure of commercial
property.
In Jurgens, supra, the Court decided whether a sheriff was entitled to the costs of
sale when mortgaged property was sold to a creditor at foreclosure. Jurgens, 19 Mont. at
186, 47 P. at 810. Like Stuart, Jurgens does not address the deficiency question. Instead,
Jurgens held that a sheriff is entitled to the statutory commission for a sale to a creditor,
because the creditor accepted the real estate in lieu of cash. Id., 19 Mont. at 187, 47 P. at
810. In the present case, there is no dispute that a sale took place or that First Bank took
possession of the real estate in lieu of cash. The only outstanding question regarding the
foreclosure is the amount of money Tuschoff is entitled to have credited against his Bank

10

debt. That question is currently being answered by

Montana First Judicial District Court

under the precedent set in the Galleria cases, rather than Jurgens.
b.

in Montana, the deficiency on commercial property is determined by
the property's intrinsic value, not the amount bid at foreclosure.

In its Response In Opposition to Summary Judgment Land Title argued that even if
the full credit

rule was not applied a material issue of fact as to the fair market value of

the property exists, precluding summary judgment. CR 481 and 482. Land Title
misconstrues Montana law as the deficiency on commercial property is determined by the
property's intrinsic value, not the amount bid at foreclosure.
Land Title incorrectly asserts the Galleria line of cases is applicable only to cases
wherein the property's fair market value exceeds the amount bid at sale. Land Title reasons
that a bank should not be entitled to the same equitable analysis of a property's intrinsic
value, for fear that some banks would obtain a double recovery through "unscrupulous"
bidding practices. As First Bank has consistently maintained, it has never sought double
recovery, rather it only seeks to be made whole. Further, the Galleria cases make clear, there
is no possibility of a double recovery when the Court objectively determines the intrinsic
value of the property sold.
In Galleria I, the Montana Supreme Court observed that mortgage foreclosure

proceedings rest in the court's equity jurisdiction. Galleria I, 239 Mont. at 265, 780 P.2d at
617. The equitable nature of foreclosure proceedings required the trial court to look beyond
the bid amount and determine the intrinsic value of the property. Id. In foreclosure

11

proceedings, regardless

the relative value of

bid and the property's intrinsic value,

Montana courts have equitable power to determine the intrinsic value of the foreclosed
property. The Montana First Judicial District Court is currently engaged in this equitable
analysis.
In Galleria, the Court was concerned about the effect of a "low-ball" bid.
Nonetheless, the Court cautions against using the amount bid at the trustee's
sale as the sole determinant of the fair market value of the property being
sold. In the present case, the parties apparently acknowledged that the hotel
alone was not adequate to secure the loan from the Bank to Parks. For this
reason, the paiiies agreed to pledge additional security from the Washington
bowling alley.

This raises a genuine issue of material fact which precluded granting Parks'
motion for summary judgment. The Court will need to take in additional
evidence to determine if the Bank is owed a deficiency amount by Parks.
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 11~12, Montana First Judicial District Court,
Cause No. DDV-2014-326 (July 19, 2018).
It was error for the District Court to conclude that First Bank was not entitled to a
deficiency. That error is placed in sharper contrast now that a Montana court, applying
Montana law, is taking evidence on the intrinsic value of the property to determine the
deficiency. Moreover, it is precisely this inquiry into the property's intrinsic value that will
ensure neither First Bank nor the borrowers end up with a windfall. The Montana court's
determination will ensure that the borrowers are credited the intrinsic value of the property
at the time of foreclosure -

nothing more and nothing less. First Bank, meanwhile, will be

entitled to pursue any deficiency left after the value of the property is deducted from the
amount owed. As a matter of law, First Bank can claim a deficiency amount owing and the

12

District Court's holding to the contrary constitutes an error of law. In the alternative, there
are material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment.
3.

The Full Credit Bid Rule Does Not Bar First Bank's Causes Of Action.

Land Title argues that the full credit bid law meant to protect borrowers from double
recoveries, creditor windfalls (Respondent's Brief pgs. 16 - 18) and "unscrupulous
underbidding by lenders at foreclosure sales to drive the price down." Respondent's Brief,
pg. 22). Land Title's arguments are founded on false premises. First Bank does not seek a
double recovery. Instead, it only seeks to be made whole. Second, it is uncontested that First
Bank did not engage in underbidding. Third, as set forth above, under Montana law, any
deficiency on commercial property is determined by the property's intrinsic value, not the
amount bid at foreclosure and this works against a double recovery. Because the very
reasons for application of the full credit bid rule are not present, it is inapplicable.
a.

First Bank seeks to be made whole.

The uncontested facts of this matter establish that First Bank provided the Hotel loan
only because it was secured via the Hotel and the Bowling Alley. When, the Bowling Alley
was to be sold, First Bank's Bowling Alley interest appeared in the title report. Land Title,
who was acting as an escrow, was directed to pay off First Bank's interest and Land Title
represented it would do so. Had Land Title done what it was required to do, First Bank
would have been paid and would have applied the Bowling Alley sale funds to the Hotel
loan. The Hotel loan would have been greatly reduced, such that there may have been
enough equity in the Hotel to cover the loan and therefore renew it. In the alternative, had
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Tuschoff defaulted, First Bank would have bid on the Hotel, resold
between

and any overage

amounts received from the Bowling Alley and the resale of the Hotel and

was due on the loan would have been returned to Tuschoff. In either event,

would not

have been a double recovery or a windfall.
In its brief at page 2, § B, Land Title states that the "[t]he Complaint alleges that
First Bank suffered damages

the amount of the original loan ... , less the fair-market

value of the Hotel Lincoln." Land Title's admission demonstrates that First Bank does not
seek double recovery. Rather, First Bank seeks that amount of its original loan, less what it
received from a good faith buyer for the Hotel, plus interest,

and costs.

In its full credit bid argument Land Title claims the full credit bid rule keeps lenders
from cutting off or discouraging lower bidders and "deprives the sale of whatever leaven
comes from other bidder." Respondent's Brief, pg. 18. Land Title has consistently argued
that First Bank was the only bidder at the sale. Respondent's Brief, pg. 8. Hence, the "other
bidder" issues raised by Land Title, by its own admission, would not have occurred.
Land Title's arguments are based on false premises and are without merit.
b.

None of the full credit bid rule cases cited by Land Title address the
facts at bar,

None of the full credit bid rule cases cited by Land Title address the material facts of
this matter. Significantly, First Bank's loan was contingent upon two pieces of collateral, not
one; none of the cases cited by Land Title address this material fact. Further, in Judge
Reynold's Order on Summary Judgment, which addresses the facts of the instant case, he
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held that the additional security

was the Bowling

raised

genume issue of

material fact that precluded summary judgment. First Bank's Appendix, pg. 19.
Moreover, in the matter at bar, the collateral that was the Bowling Alley closed first.
Had Land Title done what it was obligated to do, the Bowling Alley fonds would have been
provided to First Bank and then applied to Tuschoff s loan. As a result, what was due and
owing on the Hotel loan would have been known. Had Tuschoff defaulted on the Hotel loan,
First Bank could have bid accordingly (there were no other bidders) and any overages would
have been returned to Tuschoff.
Similarly, unlike the cases cites by Land Title, in this matter there is not a monetary
shortfall due to application of the full credit bid rule. Rather, there is a shmifall because
Land Title breached its fiduciary duty and it failed to do what it said it would do. It is not
equitable for Land Title to be the self-created proximate cause of the issues at bar, and then
benefit from it nonfeasance at First Bank's expense.
c.

Full credit bid rule law holds that actions against non-borrower third
parties such as Land Title are viable.

On one hand, Land Title claims that emerging full credit bid law, which holds that
actions against third parties such as Land Title are not barred, does not apply to this matter.
Respondent's Brief§ IV (2)(d), pgs. 25 - 39. On the other hand, Land Title concedes that as
it argued below, there are exceptions to the full credit bid rule and "an action against a third

party will still lie in the face

the Full Credit Bid Rule where an erroneous full credit bid

was proximately caused bv the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations or misconduct,"
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citing, All. Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1247, 900 P.2d 601, 614 (1995)
(emphasis added) Respondent's Brief, pg. 25.
Land Title quotes a small portion of All. Mortg. Co and concludes that because there
is no dispute that Land Title had nothing to do with the bid made by First Bank, the
fraud/misconduct exception does not apply. Land Title's quote is misleading and its "no
dispute" conclusion, erroneous.
This issue and holding of All. Mortg. Co., was self-stated by the Court:
We here determine whether a lender's acquisition of security property by full
credit bid at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale bars the lender as a matter of law
from maintaining a fraud action against third party nonborrowers who
fraudulently induced the lender to make the loans. The Courts of Appeal are
in conflict on this issue. We granted review to resolve the conflict, and now
conclude that such an action is not precluded. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
10 Cal.4th 1231. As Land Title concedes and All. Mortg. Co, holds in the instance of fraud
or misconduct, actions against third party nonborrowers are not precluded.
First Bank disputes Land Title's claim that it had nothing to do with First Bank's bid
and its implication that its actions did not constitute misconduct. As discussed above, given
First Bank's interest in the Bowling Alley, had Land Title done what it was required to do,
and paid First Bank the sale funds from the Bowling Alley, those funds would have been
applied to Tuschoff s loan and First Bank would have known precisely what was due at the
time of the Hotel auction and therefore what to bid (amount of the loan due, minus the
Bowling Alley funds= bid amount). As it turned out, due to Land Title's nonfeasance, First
Bank was unable to discern a correct bid amount until the Hotel was resold because, at the
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time of the Hotel foreclosure, it could not know
is little

the Hotel resale would provide. There

this untenable situation was proximately caused by

Title's failure to

First Bank when the Bowling Alley sale closed. Thus, Land Title's nonfeasance had much to
do with First Bank's bid.
Land Title claims that fraud or misconduct are the only exceptions to the full credit
bid rule. Response Brief: pg. 26. Land Title's nonfeasance via its failure to

First Bank

the funds it held in trust meets the definition of "misconduct." Additionally, the cases cited
by First Bank establish that fraud and misconduct are not the only exceptions to the full
credit bid rule. Bank of America,

v. First American Title Insurance Co., 499 Mich. 74,

878 N.W.2d 816 (2016) ("closing instructions constitute a contract upon which a breach of
contract claim can be brought." Id. at 80, 878 N.W.2d at 818.); Kolodge v Boyd, 88
Cal.App.4th 349, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (2001) ("the full credit rule does not bar claims of
negligence and negligent misrepresentation." 88 Cal. App. 4th at 353); Glenham v. Palzer,
58 Wn. App. 294, 792 P.2d 511 (Div. I, 1990) (''the full credit bid rule does not bar an
action alleging ... negligence and breach of fiduciary duty." 58 Wn. App. at 298, 792 P.2d
at 553).
Land Title next argues that the Bowling Alley was a "second form of security"
whereas the Hotel was the "first form of security." Thus, having foreclosed on the first form,
First Bank was precluded from foreclosing on the second. Respondent's Brief, pg. 28. Land
Title's claim is contrary to AVCO Fin. Servs. a/Billings One, Inc., v. Christiaens, 201 Mont.
117, 652 P.2d 220 (1982) wherein the Montana Supreme Court held that a secured creditor
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is not required to first take possession and dispose of collateral, before obtaining a judgment
and execution upon other property owned by a debtor. 201 Mont. at 120. Hence, there are no
first or second forms of security and a creditor can foreclose on security in any order it sees
fit. Land Title also has its facts backward. The Bowling Alley sale closed first and First
Bank was to receive funds from that sale; if there had been a default (there may not have
been) the Hotel foreclosure would have come second. Land Title cannot create a problem
via its nonfeasance and then attempt to blame others (First Bank or First American Title) for
the proximate result of that which it caused.
Land Title confuses the Bank of America, supra, facts and tries to distinguish it on
the basis that the First American's and Westminster's right to recover came from a separate
contract. Respondent's Brief, pg. 32. Bank of America's holding rests on the fact that
defendant First American failed to follow closing instructions which proximately caused
damages. The same circumstances exist at bar: Land Title's failure to follow closing
instructions proximately caused First Bank to be damaged. Moreover, when Tuschoff
contractually assigned his rights in the Bowling Alley to First Bank the escrow contract that
had been between Tuschoff and Land Title, became a contract between First Bank and Land
Title. Given the Bank of America holding, under the facts of this case, whether the two
contracts were separate is a distinction without a legal difference.
Land Title next argues that First Bank's right of recovery is entirely derived from its
right to recover a deficiency. Respondent's Brief, pg. 33. Land Title also claims First Bank's
damages claim against it are derived solely from losses between First Bank and Tuschoff.
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Respondent's Brief, pg. 33. Land Title then claims the alleged "contract"/escrow agreement
cannot give First Bank greater rights than it would have received had no alleged "breach"
(i.e. dispersing the funds to Tuschoff or releasing the deed of trust) taken place. Id First

Bank's response to each of Land Title's claims is founded in the same uncontested facts.
When Tuschoff assigned his rights in the Bowling Alley to First Bank, it stood in Tuschoff
shoes. As a result, whatever rights Tuschoff had in the escrow account and its funds, and
whatever duties Land Title owned Tuschoff, were owed to First Bank. When Land Title
negligently failed to tender the Bowling Alley sale funds to First Bank, in accordance with
First American's instructions, Land Title breached the contract and the fiduciary duty it
owed to First Bank. First Bank's actionable rights are independent of any deficiency and
independent of any losses between First Bank and Tuschoff. First Bank has never claimed
rights greater than what Tuschoff had vis-a-vis Land Title, nor does it need to.
Land Title again attempts to distinguish the first bid rule exception cases cited by
First Bank on the basis that they only apply in instances of fraud. Respondent's Brief, pgs.
35 - 38. As discussed above, the cases cited by First Bank address actions for fraud, breach
of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. With the
exception of fraud, the uncontested facts establish most of these actionable instances are
present here. 4

4

First Bank will likely amend its complaint to add causes of action for negligent misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion.
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Land Title concludes its full credit bid rule arguments by claiming that "this case is
about alleged impairment to First Bank's security interest, and

Full Credit Bid

renders moot any such alleged impairment." Id., at 38. As argued multiple times, this case is
about Land Title's nonfeasance, its breach of contract, its failure to follow escrow
instructions and

concomitant breach of its fiduciary duty to turn over escrow funds it held

trust, to their assigned owner, First Bank.
As a matter of law, the trial court erred when it held that

Bank's full credit bid

for the Hotel extinguished its causes of action against Land Title. In the alternative, there are
genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment

C.

Alternative Grounds Exist To Hold That The Trial Court Erred.
Land Title's brief at § II (B), pg. 11 raises "alternative grounds" which "provide an

independent basis to uphold the District Court's decision." These "alternative grounds" were
not addressed in the lower court's summary judgment ruling, nor addressed in First Bank's
Notice of Appeal. In raising alternative grounds, Land Title has opened the door to
additional issues presented on appeal, and these grounds further support First Bank's
assertion that the District Court erred.
1.

The District Court Erred When It Did Not Hold That Land Title Was
Negligent As A Matter Of Law.

In Idaho, negligence requires proof of: "( 1) the existence of a duty, recognized by
law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and
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(4) actual loss or damage." Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores,

, 150 Idaho 774,

251

602,605 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l

Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 1

- 76, 804 P.2d 900, 904 - 05 (1991). The uncontested facts

of Land Title's negligence have been previously stated in First Bank of Lincoln's Brief at
§ III, pgs. 5 - 10, and need not be repeated in full here.

short, Tuschoff contracted with Land

to act as his long term escrow agent, to

manage the Bowling Alley funds, and hold them in trust. When First Bank loaned funds to
Tuschof[ he assigned his interest in the Bowling Alley to

Bank.

When the encumbered Bowling Alley was sold, First American Title's Tonja
Hatcher, emailed a copy of the title report to Land Title's Rita Johnson, who handled the
Schwab/Tuschoff escrow account. First American's title commitment at 123 included the
Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust and First Bank assignment. Numerous e-mails between
Hatcher and Johnson demonstrate that Hatcher reminded Johnson about the ,r23 exception
on multiple occasions and in one instance, even placed an arrow next to ,r23 and circled
"First Bank" in the sentence referencing First Bank's assignment. This title report, in concert
with the emails, put Land Title on notice that Tuschoff's interest in the Bowling Alley had
been assigned to First Bank. Thus, the fiduciary duties Land Title owed to Tuschoff, and the
funds Land Title held for Tuschoff, it held in trust for First Bank.
On April 15, 2013, Johnson acknowledged First Bank's interest when she sent an
email to Hatcher which stated '·both deeds of trust will be paid." About June 24, 2013,

21

Columbia Bank sent closing instructions. The closing instructions stated: "We request that
exceptions 21 and 23 be released." Johnson's response: "We are good to go."
Land Title ignored Tuschoff

First Bank assignment, ignored Hatcher's written

closing instructions, and disbursed the funds was holding in trust on behalf of First Bank to
Tuschoff. Notably, all

this occurred without

Bank's knowledge, and it

· not learn

of it until it subsequently contacted Land Title as part of an annual loan revievv.
Land Title holds itself out to the public as having professionals in the areas of title
msurancc, escrows

long-term escrows. In

its website states: "Land

of Nez

Perce County is a locally owned company comprised of dedicated professionals. We strive
to meet your needs through knowledge, experience and attention to detail, while maintaining
a vested interest in our community."

:ps://landti.1kh.:\\iston.con1_.

When Land Title undertook the obligation to handle the Schwab/Tuschoff long-term
escrow account, it O'v\cd a duty to those who held interests in the funds Land Title would
disburse from escrow. With Tuschoff's assignment of his Bowling Alley interests to First
Bank, that duty inured to First Bank. Land Title breached this duty when, despite multiple
reminders regarding First Bank's interest, Land Title paid nothing to First Bank. Land
Title's breach proximately caused actual loss and damage to First Bank.

In All American Realty, Inc. v Sweet, l

Idaho 229, 687 P.2d 1356 (1984), this

Court addressed the duty of an attorney acting as closing agent in a real estate transaction,
and the failure of that attorney to pay the broker its commission as required by the earnest
money agreement and escrow instructions. In resolution of this issue, this Court noted:
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Am.Jur

Escrou

9 16, the rule is

Where a person assumes to and does act as the depositary in
escrow, he is absolutelv bound bv the terms and conditions of
the deposit and charged with a strict execution of the duties
voluntarily assumed. He is held to strict compliance with the
terms of the escrow agreement; and he may not perform anv
acts with reference to handling the deposit or its disposal.
which are not authorized by the contract of deposit.
Bv failing to pay the broker·s commission in accordance with the earnest
monev agreement, Sweet violated one of FmHA·s express instructions and
breached his duty as the depositary. He is therefore liable to All American for
the losses it suffered due to his breach:
Since the depositary is bound by the terms of the deposit and
charged with the duties voluntarily assumed by him, the rule is
that liability attaches to him if
improperly parts with his
deposit. His breach of duty in this respect has been held to
constitute conversion. If he violates instructions or acts
negligently he is ordinarily liab1e for any loss occasioned bv
his breach of duty. 28 Am.Jur.2d Escrow§ 18.

id., 107 ldaho 229, 203-231 (emphasis added). In the instant case, Land Title, as a
depositary in escrow, violated the instructions to clear the title exception at i/23. when it did
not pay First Bank what it was owed. Under All American Realty, Inc., Id., Land Title is
liable for any loss occasioned by its breach of duty when it acted as a depositary escrow. and
the District Court should have held that Land Title was negligent as a matter of law.
"Causation'' is generally a question of

for the jury although the issue may

resolved on summary judgment "when reasonable minds could only come to one
conclusion." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 272, 281 P.3d 103, 109 (2012). Here. a
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reasonable person could conclude that Land Title's nonfeasance proximately caused First
Bank's damages as a matter oflaw.
Land Title argues that under Chavez v. Barrus. 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036
(2008), it owed no duty to First Bank. Respondent's Brief~ pg. 38. Chavez is easily
distinguished.

Chavez pivots on the fact that "Chavez has presented no meaningful legal or factual
argument establishing the existence of a duty owed to her by First American." The facts at
bar are opposite, First Bank

provided meaningful facts and law which establish that as a

result of Tuschoff's assignment to First Bank, Land Title was holding funds in trust for First
Bank· s benefit. Further, as a result of the

ii23

exception in the title documents, Land Title

knew or should have known of its fiduciary obligation to First Bank. In

Response In

Opposition to Summary Judgment, Land Title Land Title argued that there was an issue of
fact as to negligence in the form of a deviation from applicable duty. CR 488 and 489. There
arc few duties greater than a fiduciary duty. Hence, contrary to Chavez. a duty was owed to
First Bank, both factually and legally.
Further, in All Amer;can Realty, Inc. v. Sweet, supra, this Court indicated that where
an entity such as Land Title, assumes to and docs act as the depositary in escrow, it is
absolutely bound by the terms and conditions of the deposit and charged with a strict
execution of the duties voluntarily assumed. If it violates instructions or acts negligently it is
ordinarily liable for any loss occasioned by its breach of duty.
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Vis-a-vis negligence and summary judgment, the "reasonable
for a purpose. Given the uncontested

doctrine exists

regarding the Tuschoff's assignment to !·

Bank, Land Title's fiduciary duty regarding the funds it held in trust for First Bank as a
result of

assignment,

written escrmv instructions, and Land Title' representation that

it would follow the instructions. reasonable minds could conclude that Land Title was
negligent when it paid nothing to First Bank

everything to Tuschoff. Hence, the District

Court erred when it failed to hold that Land Title was negligent as a matter oflaw.
Land Title claims that First Bank's choice to proceed to enforce the Bowling Alley
deed of trust in the Washington matter and then to voluntarily give up that deed of trust
constituted an election of remedies, or raised a judicial estoppel or quasi estoppel or prevents
proof of any damages against Land Title. Response Brief, pg. 39.
To establish ·'choice to proceed" claim, Land Title concedes it must prove:
( 1) There must be in fact t,vo or more coexisting remedies between which the
party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must be
inconsistent; and (3) he must, by actually bringing his action or by some
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between
two inconsistent remedies.

Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1066-67, 695 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (1984). Among
other things, Land Title admits that the ·'choice doctrine" is limited to a choice by a party
between inconsistent remedial rights; the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to or a
repudiation of the other. Largilliere Co., Bankers v. Kunz, 41 Idaho 767, 772, 244 P. 404,
405 (1925)). Land Title has failed to show how First Bank's two alleged remedial rights are
repugnant to or a repudiation of the other. Land Title claims a dichotomy between the
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Washington lawsuit which it alleges was about recovery of the deed of trust from Tuschoff
and alleges that in the current case, First Bank has taken the position that its deed of trust
was released.
Land Title makes up supporting facts. There is nothing in First Bank's Amended
Complaint (CR 235 - 246) which alleges that a deed of trust was released nor has First Bank
asserted a cause of action on that basis. Rather, First Bank's complaint sets forth facts that
show Land Title had an obligation to First Bank, failed to do what it was required to do and
said it would do, and as a proximate result, First Bank was injured. Because Land Title's
choice to proceed claim is based upon an unsupported fallacy, it must fail.
Moreover, while Land Title has set forth the three elements it must prove, other than
several conclusory statements, it fails to show how each of the elements are legally met.
Further, "[i]nconsistency of remedies is defined not as an inconsistency between the
remedies, but as an inconsistency in the facts relied upon. 'To make actions inconsistent one
action must allege what the other denies, or the allegation in one must necessarily repudiate
or be repugnant to the other."' Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1067, 695 P.2d at 1206 (quoting
Taylor v. Robertson Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 822, 137 P.2d 150, 154 (Kan. 1943)). There is
no consistency of the facts relied upon and Land Title has not and cannot show such.
Ill
Ill
Ill
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a.

The economic

rule

not

In its briefing, Land Title argues that First Bank's negligence action is barred by the
economic loss rule. Respondent's Brief, pg. 39. Land Title is incorrect 5.
There are two exceptions to the general rule which prevents a party from
recovering purely economic loss in a tort claim; those two exceptions are,
( l) where a special relationship exists between the parties, or (2) where
unique circumstances require a reallocation of the risk. Just 's, Inc., 99 Idaho
at 4 70, 583 P.2d at 1005. A special relationship exists "where the relationship
hetween the parties such tha1 it would be equitable to impose such a duty."
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. The special relationship
exception to the economic loss rule is an extremely narrow exception which
ies in only limited circumstances. This Court has found a special
relationship to exist in only two situations, ( 1) "where a professional or quasiprofessional performs personal services [; ]" and (2) "where an entity holds
out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function,
and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance of that
function." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001; see McAlvain v. Gen.
Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777. 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976); see also
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1 1.

Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 79L 215 P.3d 505 (2009) (emphasis
supplied). The conjunctive ''or" as opposed to '·and," establishes that First Bank only has to
prove one exception. Here,
( l)

exceptions apply.

The special relationship exception applies.

Land Title holds itselr out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized
function (title insurance and escrow), and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its

5

This Court has addressed the economic loss rule since at least 1978. Yet, in All American Realty.
Inc., supra, the Cow1 allmvcJ recovery of economic damages that were unpaid
the depository
in escrmv and the economic loss rule did not bar the 1984 action. Thus. the economic loss rule
does not bar First Bank's action.
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performance of

function. Similarly. Land·

claims to be dedicated professionals and

it performs the very personal service of holding funds in escrow and parsing them out in
accordance with underlying instructions. The special relationship exception tv,ice applies.
In McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
Court considered an instance where an insurer appealed from a jury verdict judgment
finding it liable for its negligent failure to issue sufficient insurance to plainti

McAlvain on

the inventory at his retail store. The insurer argued that it owed no duty to McAlvain which
would subject it to liability.

part of

analysis. this Court stated:

We must first consider appellant's argument that McAlvain's causes of action
must be grounded. if at all, in contract rather than tort. The weight of
authority is that the insured may recover under either theory. Adkins and
Ainley, Inc. v. Busada, 270 A.2d l 35 (D.C.App. 1970); Hellbaum v. Burwell
& M.orford. I Wn.App. 694, 463 P.2d 225 (1969); Austin v. Fulton Insurance
Co., 444 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1968); Anderson Feed & Produce Co. v. Moore,
66 Wn.2d
7, 401 P.2d 964 (1965);
see 3 Couch on Insurance 2d, §
25.32, and
Am.Jur.]d, Insurance, § 174. In Hellbaum, supra, a case which
involved facts similar to this case, a jury award in favor of the insured was
affirmed bv the Washington Court of Appeals on contract, tort and
promissorv estoppel theories.
A person in the business of selling insurance holds himself out to the public
as being experienced and knowledgeable in this complicated and specialized
field. The interest of the state that competent persons become insurance
agents is demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the state,
LC. § 41-1030; pass an examination administered by the state, I.C. § 411038; and meet ce11ain qualifications, I . § 41-1034. An insurance agent
performs a personal service for his client, in advising him about the kinds and
extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate insurance contract
for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance agent,
relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise in placing his insurance problems
the agent's hands. See discussion in Riddle-Duckworth,
v. Sullivan,
253 S.C. 411, 171 S.E.2d 486 (1969).
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McA!vain, 97 Idaho 781 (emphasis added). Similarly, an entity such as Land Titk, that sells

title insurance or provides escrow services holds itself out to the

as being experienced

and knowledgeable in this specialized field.
In Idaho, title insurance companies and title insurance agents are licensed
professionals

come under the purview of the Idaho Department of Insurance, They arc

controlled by LC. 41 2017 et seq. LC. 41-2710 sets forth the requirements

title insurance

agents. They must obtain "a license from the director of insurance and file a bond or cash
deposit in lieu thereof as required herein." LC. 41.2711 sets forth the statutory requirements
for title insurance related businesses and specifically defines an escrow officer as "an officer
or an employee of a title insurance agent whose duties include any of the following:
handling escrows, settlements. closings, and funds related thereto, , .. "
Land Title is also bound by lDAPA 18.01 .25, et seq. lDAPA 18.01.25

I sets forth

the purpose of Chapter 25:
001. TITLE AND SCOPE.
The purpose of these rules is to adopt with reference to title insurance and
title insurance agents and escrow officers rules governing rates charged for
various services and insurability on certain matters: rules governing
procedural methods as to the way the title insurers, title insurance agents and
their officers are to perform certain actions and rules governing actions of
title insurance agents and employees acting as escrow agents. The purpose is
to further protect consumers of title insurance industrv products by ensuring
that consumers are not injured bv delivery of certain funds or documents (for
recordation or otherwise) from an escrow without prior receipt of "collected
funds" by the escrow agent and to preserve the financial stabilitv of title
insurers and title insurance agents. (emphasis added)
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IDAPA 18.01.25.011, sets forth ten rules that govern "Title Insurance Agents and
Employees Acting as Escrow Agents." Entities such as Land Title arc well regulated.
This Court concluded that when an insurance agent perfonns his services
negligently, to the insurcd's detriment, he should

held liable for

negligence just as

would an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other professional who negiigently
performs personal services. Consequently,

Court held that the insurer was liable to

McAlvain for damages resulting from its tortious conduct. The District Court should have
reached the same conclusion and held that under the special relationship exception, Land
Title is liable to First Bank in tort.
(2)

The unique circumslances exception also applies.

The umque circumstances exception involves '·unique circumstances requmng a
different allocation of risk." Just 's Inc. v. Arrington Consir. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583
P.2d 997, 1005 ( 1978). The circumstances at bar meet this articulated standard.
As previously established, Land Title holds itself out to the public as "dedicated
professionals'' who strive to meet their client's needs "through kncn:\ledge, experience and
attention to detail." https://landtitlckwiston.con11 • It practices in a heavily regulated industry
that expects much of them. In addition, Land Title holds large sums of money, in trust. Via
multiple reminders, Hatcher made Land Title aware of the title exception that was
Tuschoff s assignment to First Bank, and she directed Land Title to address it. The report
and reminders put Land Title on notice that because Tuschoff assigned his interests to First
Bank, Land Title's duty was now to first Bank. In short, First Bank did all it could be
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reasonably expected to do to protect its loan and Tuschoff's assignment. Not only did Land
its fiduciary duty and its contractual obligation, but it never informed First Bank

Title

it was holding funds in trust on First Bank's behalf. First Bank was unaware of Land Title's
nonfeasance until it contacted Land Title to find out about its collateral. only to learn that it
had been sold.
These umque circumstances reqmre a different allocation of
assumed

Land Title

risk of acting as an escrow. The title report and the exceptions set forth therein

,vere clear. As professionals. Land Title knew or should have known of its assigned duties
vis-a-vis First Bank. The circumstances only become more stark when one takes into
account that on several occasions. Hatcher specifically reminded Land Title of what it must
do. Land Title did not properly perform its tasks, negligently breached its fiduciary duty to
First Bank; and as a proximate result, First Bank was damaged. This Court should also apply
the unique circumstances exception and hold Land Title liable to First Bank in tort as a
matter of law.

b.

There is not a stat we of limitations issue.

Land Title claims Washington's statute of limitation bars Frist Bank's negligence
claim. Respondent's Brief: pg. 39.
Like Idaho, Washington state's statute of limitations are determined via the
discovery rule. The discovery rule provides that a statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the plaintiff: using reasonable diligence, \Vould have discovered the cause of action.

Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 ( 1986), citing, US. Oil & Ref C'o. v.
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Department of Ecology,

Wn.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 329 (1981). Here, 'irst Bank ·s cause of

action v\as not discovered until First

contacted Land Title as part of an annual

review and learned that the Bowling Alley had been sold and the resulting funds sent to
Tuschoff. On or about January 29, 2014, Ms. Johnson spoke to Mr. Tuschoff and told him
that the funds derived from the Bowling Alley sale should have been forwarded to First
Bank and not to

Tuscho

and the bank learned the misdirected funds would not be

returned. Under Washington's discovery rule, the three-year statute of limitation did not
begin to run until January, 201

First Bank

within the three years set forth in

its Complaint on November

2016, well

statute. In the alternative, the discovery rule raises an

issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.
2.

The District Court Erred When It Did Not Hold That Land Title Breached Its
Contract And Harmed First Bank. In the Alternative, First Bank \\fas A
Third-Party Beneficiary Under the Contract.

Land Title contractually agreed to act as a long-term escrow for Tuschoff vis-a-vis
his interest in the Bowling Alley. When Tuschoff assigned his rights in the Bowling Alley,
to First Bank, Tuschoff s rights and Land Title's concomitant fiduciary duties vis-a-vis the
escrow account funds it was holding in trust transferred to First Bank.
When the Bowling Alley was being sold, Land Title's additional duties as lo the
escrow account were to create clear title by distributing funds to the persons or entities who
were designated as exceptions on the title report. First Bank's registered assignment of
Tuschoff s interest
exception

a deed of trust and promissory note was clearly set forth in 123 's

the title report. Despite multiple reminders of this exception and Land Title's
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written, e-mail representation stating that "both
breached

of trust will

paid," Land Title

s contract when it did not pay the deed of trust and their holder, First Bank.

Because, of the contractual assignment, First Bank stood in Tuschoff' s shoes and the
Bowling Alley sale funds should have been paid to it. In the alternative, because the title
report exception had to be paid off so as to provide clear title to lender Columbia Bank, First
Bank was a third party beneficiary and sale funds should have been paid to it. Either way,
summary ·udgment should have been granted in First Bank's favor as a matter of law and
the District Court erred when it did not do so.
3.

The District Court Erred When It Did Not Order Land Title To Speeificallv
Perform The Contract And Pay First Bank In Accordance With The
Assignment And The Escrow Instructions.

In .Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 59L 349 P.3d 390 (2011), this Court addressed
specific performance, stating:
The remedy of specific performance may be invoked where necessary to
complete justice between the parties. "The object of specific performance is
to best effectuate the purpose for which the contract is made, and specific
performance should be granted upon such terms and conditions as justice
requires." 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 2 (2011 ). In considering
whether to award specific performance, a court must balance the equities
between the parties. Fullerton v. Grisivold, 142 Idaho 820, 823, 136 P.3d
291,294 (2006).

Fazzio v. Mason, 349 P.3d at 396-397.
Land Title contractually agreed to act as an escrow for Tuschoff vis-a-vis his interest
in the Bowling Alley. When Tuschoff assigned his rights in the Bowling Alley to First Bank,
Tuschoff's rights, and Land Title's duties as to the escrow account, transferred to First Bank.
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When the Bowling Alley \vas being sold, Land

s duties as escrO\v was to create clear

title by distributing funds to the persons or entities who were designated as exceptions on
title report. First Bank's registered assignment of Tuschoffs interest in a deed of trust and
promissory note was clearly set forth in 123 's exception of the

report. Despite:

(1) multiple reminders of this exception; (2) Land Title's written, e-mail representation
stating that "both deeds of trust will be paid:" and, (3) closing instructions that requested
that Exception 23 be released, Land Title failed to perform that which it was required to do
under the contract. Land Title should be ordered to do that which it did not, and pay First
Bank. The equities between the parties can be seen above in First Bank's unique
circwnstances argument at § IV. (C)(a)(2). In short, First Bank is with little fault, whereas
Land Title is entirely at fault.
Land Title argues that specific performance

1s

a remedy, not a cause of action.

Respondent's Brief~ pg. 41.
In Peterson v. Genti/lon, 154 Idaho 184,296 P.3d 390 (2013),

Court addressed

the follmving issue: "[ w ]hether the five-year statute of limitations for actions arising from
contracts bars the Partnership's claim for specific performance." Id. 296 P.3d 394. In its
analysis, this Comi noted that i1 had never specifically addressed whether l.C. § 5-216 bars
actions for specific performance where the claimant or vcndcc is in possession o the
property. Rather, in an action for specific performance where the claimant was not in
possession of the property, the Court held that the statute of limitations applied and began
to run at the time ''the cause of action accrued in the vendcc." Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho
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149,151,559 P.2d 765, 767 (1977). However, this Court explicitly noted that the vendees
"did not have and never have had possession of the property in question." Id. at 150, 559

P.2d at 766.
Here, there is no indication that the cause of action for specific
performance accrued in the Partnership when it failed to exchange deeds
with the Gentillons after the survey's completion.

ld., 154 Idaho 18'-:1. (emphasis added). This Court held that the five-year statute of
limitations under LC. § 5-216 did not bar the Partnership's claim for specific performance.

If, as Land Title claims, Idaho does not recognize specific performance actions, that, by
itself, would have been determinative and the Gentillon Court would not have needed to
address the issue of whether the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Given the

Gentillon Court's decision and its "action for specific performance" language, this Court
clearly recognized specific pcrformance actions. Further, that this Court differentiated a
cause of action for specific performance from a cause of action for contract, establishes that
Idaho recognizes actions for specific performance and, in fact, distinguishes contractual
actions from specific performance actions.
First Bank's motion for summary judgment as to specific performance should have
been granted as a matter of law, and the District Court erred when it did not do so.

4.

The District Court Erred When It Did Not Hold That Land Title Should Be
Estopped From Not Doing What It Represented That It Would Do.

In Silicon Intern. Ore, LLC v. Afonsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 314 P.3d 593 (2013).
this Court addressed Idaho quasi-estoppcl law, stating that '·[t)he doctrine of quasi-estoppcl
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prevents a party from reapmg an unconscionable advantage, or from imposing an
unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing positions. Garner v. Bartschi, 139
Idaho 430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003)." It then distinguished equitable estoppel from
quasi-estoppel stating: "(u]like equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel does not require either
misrepresentation by one party or the reliance by the other." Id. (emphasis suppled).
The Silicon Court set forth the elements of quasi-estoppel as follows:

*

[Quasi-estoppel] prevents a party from asserting to another's
disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously
taken by him or her.

*

The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to
allow a person to maintain a position with one in which he
acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit.

*

The act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought must
have gained some advantage to himself or produced some
disadvantage to another; ....

Silicon v. Monsanto, supra, 314 P.3d 60 (quoting E. Idaho Agric. Credit Ass 'n v. Neibaur,
133 Idaho 402,410, 987 P.2d 314,322 (1999)).
The first element prevents Land Title from asserting, to First Bank's disadvantage,
the right to obtain payment under the title report exception at ,!23, which Land Title was
required to address, would be expected to address, and, in fact, stated it would address, but
did not.
The second element applies because it would be unconscionable for Land Title to
hold itself out to the public as a professional title insurance and escrow company, profit
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from doing so (the benefit), represent that it would address the title report exception at 123,
and then not do so.
The third element applies because Land Title gained advantage by acting as the
escrow company and getting paid to do so, and produced a disadvantage to First Bank which
was not paid from funds Land Title held in trust, as First Bank should have been.
As to each of the elements, Land Title owed a duty to First Bank when Tuschoff
assigned his interest in the Bowling Alley to First Bank via the deed of trust and promissory
note demonstrated in the title exception at if23. Further, Land Title was given multiple
reminders of Tuschoff' s assignment and the if23 exception. Closing instructions stated that
exception 123 be released so as to provide clear title, and Land Title represented that both
deeds of trust would be paid. Had Land Title done what it said it would do First Bank would
have been paid, the funds would have been applied to the Hotel loan, and we would not be
before the Court. Hence, Land Title should be estopped from claiming it should not have to
pay First Bank and do what it said it would do and First Bank's summary judgment on this
issue, should have been granted.
D.

First Bank Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal.

In Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), this Court held that
attorney fees are available to a prevailing party under I. C. § 12-121 and will be awarded in
any case when "justice so requires." Further, if First Bank prevails on appeal it is entitled to
costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
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Land Title argues that if it prevails it should be awarded attorney fees because First
Bank's action is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. In support, it attempts to
reduce all that First Bank has asserted in this matter to one claim: "[First Bank's] whole
claim against Land Title ... appears to be premised on Land Title having caused that deed
of trust to be improperly released." First Bank's complaint and briefing establishes that its
claims against Land Title are founded on much more than an improper release of a deed of
trust. Hence, this Court, in its discretion, cannot be left with the abiding belief that First
Bank's case was "brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."
Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 75, 320 P.3d 1224, 1234 (2014) (citation omitted).

V. CONCLUSION
Montana's anti-deficiency law does not apply to commercial transactions. Land
Title claims attorney fees on the basis that this matter is a commercial transaction, thus
Montana's anti-deficiency law does not apply to the matter at bar and there can be a
deficiency owed to First Bank. This accords with Judge Reynold's holding in the Montana
District Court on the same facts.
Land Title argues that the full credit bid rule is meant to protect borrowers from
double recoveries, windfalls and unscrupulous underbidding by lenders at foreclosure sales.
The uncontested facts establish that none of these issues are present in this case, thus, the
full credit bid rule has no applicability in the instant matter.
Land Title concedes that the full credit bid rule does not bar actions against third
parties, but it asserts the exception applies only to instances of fraud. The cases cited by
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First Bank show that matters involving breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation are also excepted. The full credit bid rule does
not apply to this matter and the District Court erred when it ruled otherwise. In the
alternative, there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
The "alternative grounds" raised by Land Title open the door to additional issues
presented on appeal. As a matter of law, the District Court erred when it dismissed First
Bank's negligence, breach of contract/third party beneficiary, specific performance and
quasi-estoppel actions.
First Bank respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be reversed. In
the alternative, this Court should hold that there are genuine issues of fact that preclude
summary judgment. First Bank further requests that its cross motion for summary judgment
against Land Title be granted as a matter of law.
Finally, pursuant to I.A.R. 40, LC. § 12-120(3) and/or I.C. § 12-121, First Bank
requests an award of its attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED this 12 th day of November, 2018.

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
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